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Researchers in the field of Chinese studies often assume that the 
ability of Chinese NGOs to operate freely increases with their distance 
from the government, and they classify NGOs accordingly.  However, this 
study suggests that in China distance from the state is not a fixed charac-
teristic of an organization nor is increased distance always an advantage.  
Even unregistered NGOs adopt various strategies that bring them close to 
the state.  Furthermore, contrary to common expectations, independence 
does not guarantee that an NGO will adopt democratic decision-making 
structures or increase its contacts with ordinary citizens at the grassroots 
level.
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*   *   *
Past research on Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
has typically focused on their degree of autonomy from the state. 
Some researchers have understood state-society relationships 
in China in simplistic terms of a power struggle between the state and 
NGOs, with NGOs attempting to appropriate social space and the state 
attempting to control NGOs.  Those viewing Chinese civil society from 
this perspective readily interpret the activities of NGOs as evidence that 
they are actively pursuing autonomy from the state.  Some even maintain 
that if NGOs adopt tasks which the state has not directly delegated to 
them or serve the interests of their constituents, they are showing signs 
of autonomy from the state.1  These scholars seem to assume that the 
Chinese state never views independent social activity as beneficial for 
itself, despite numerous statements by Chinese officials to the contrary, 
including acknowledgments that NGOs can “help find solutions to social 
problems,” “help the government draft laws, regulations and policies 
and ensure the feasibility and correctness of laws,” facilitate “expanding 
dialogue with the international community,” and “assist the poor and al-
leviate hardship.”2  All of these government-approved functions require 
independent initiative on the part of NGOs.
In China studies, one commonly encounters a typology that catego-
rizes NGOs according to their degree of autonomy,3 as if state control 
were the only factor in all relations between NGOs and the Chinese state. 
In such typologies, the only dimension to measure is distance.  Distance 
1Jonathan Unger, “‘Bridges’: Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise of 
New Associations,” China Quarterly, no. 147 (September 1996): 795-819; Wu Fengshi, 
“Environmental GONGO Autonomy,” Good Society 12, no. 1 (2003): 35-45.
2Chen Guangyao, “China’s Nongovernmental Organizations,” International Journal of Not-for- 
Profit Law 3, no. 3 (March 2001), http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol3iss3/art_2.htm.
3Andreas Edele, Non-Governmental Organizations in China (Geneva: Centre for Applied 
Studies in International Negotiations, 2005); Elizabeth Knup, “Environmental NGOs in 
China,” China Environment Series, no. 1 (1997): 9-15; Jonathan Schwartz, “Environmental 
NGOs in China,” Pacific Affairs 77, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 28-49; Gordon White, “Prospects 
for Civil Society in China,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 29 (January 1993): 
75-76.
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is equated with freedom and independence.  The more distant a NGO is 
from the state, the better.  This dichotomous approach sees the state and 
NGOs as engaged in a zero-sum struggle over social space and expects 
that the state will regard any development outside of its control as a threat. 
Milwertz notes that often this struggle is expressed in violent imagery and 
cites, as one example, an expression about the need for “a shield against 
potential state penetration and predation.”4
According to Lu, scholars focusing on the single variable of au-
tonomy have even equated government support with control.5  Due to 
the obvious benefits of cooperation with the state, more sophisticated 
versions of this typology introduce a second variable: how beneficial, 
from the point of view of NGOs, relations with the state are.  Among 
those taking such an approach is Foster, who sees the state as providing 
associations with both opportunities and constraints, and often these op-
portunities are such that associations opt for incorporation rather than 
confrontation.6  In this view, the state not only limits but also facilitates 
the activities of NGOs.  Hence, maximizing autonomy is not the only way 
for NGOs to advance their aims.  Compromising autonomy and seeking 
connections with the state is another rational strategy.7  Researchers have 
found that Chinese NGOs are “embedded”8 and that they deliberately blur 
the demarcation between themselves and the state in order to change state 
policies from within.9  This approach recognizes the possibility of many 
4Cecilia Milwertz, “Constructing Gender and Development NGOs to Address Developmen-
tal Challenges” (paper presented at the conference of the Nordic Association for Chinese 
Studies in Reykjavik, June 3-5, 2009).  Citation from Zhang Xin and Richard Baum, “Civil 
Society and the Anatomy of a Rural NGO,” China Journal, no. 52 (July 2004): 103.
5Lu Yiyi, Non-governmental Organizations in China (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), chap. 3.
6Kenneth Foster, “Associations in the Embrace of an Authoritarian State,” Studies in Com-
parative International Development 35, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 84-109.
7Tony Saich, “Negotiating the State,” China Quarterly, no. 161 (March 2000): 124-41.
8Peter Ho, “Embedded Activism and Political Change in a Semiauthoritarian Context,” 
China Information 21, no. 2 (July 2007): 187-209; Jonathan Schwartz and Shawn Shieh, 
State and Society Responses to Social Welfare Needs in China (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).
9He Baogang, “The Making of Civil Society in China,” in Civil Society in Asia, ed. David 
C. Schak and Wayne Hudson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 114-39.
ISSUES & STUDIES
146 June 2014
positive-sum games.  Researchers have found many examples of mutually 
beneficial collaboration between NGOs and the government.10  Neverthe-
less, these researchers continue to investigate autonomy.
Despite the heavy emphasis on autonomy in the research on NGOs 
in China, autonomy is not necessarily very central to what NGOs do. 
Chinese NGOs are established not to expand social space but to do some-
thing.  They exist to promote the rights of the marginalized, to prevent 
environmental degradation, or to alleviate poverty.  To reach their goals, 
NGOs may choose to place close and cooperative relations with the gov-
ernment above autonomy, although autonomy is not irrelevant for them.11 
Because Chinese NGOs have multiple objectives, they commonly pursue 
influence and organizational sustainability even at the cost of autonomy.12
Actually, Chinese NGOs themselves perceive their autonomy as ad-
equate and see time and money as the real constraints on their activities.13 
The difficulties mentioned by NGOs interviewed for this study center 
on insecure funding, difficulties in recruiting skilled personnel, and the 
uncertain status of unregistered NGOs.  The last point underlines the fact 
that a lack of state regulation can sometimes be inconvenient to NGOs.  It 
leaves them vulnerable to repression as they do not know what they are 
not permitted to do.14  NGOs would prefer a predictable framework of 
10Caroline M. Cooper, “‘This Is Our Way In’: The Civil Society of Environmental NGOs 
in South-West China,” Government and Opposition 41, no. 1 (January 2006): 109-36; 
Simona Alba Grano, “Green Activism in Red China: The Role of Shanghai’s ENGOs 
in Influencing Environmental Politics,” Journal of Civil Society 8, no. 1 (2012): 39-61; 
Jennifer Y. J. Hsu, “Spaces of Civil Society,” Progress in Development Studies 12, no. 1 
(January 2012): 63-76; Tang Shui-Yan and Xueyong Zhan, “Civic Environmental NGOs, 
Civil Society, and Democratisation in China,” Journal of Development Studies 44, no. 3 
(March 2008): 425-48.
11Robyn Wexler, Xu Ying, and Nick Young, “NGO Advocacy in China,” China Develop-
ment Brief, special report (September 2006).
12Jude Howell, “Women’s Organizations and Civil Society in China,” International Femi-
nist Journal of Politics 5, no. 2 (July 2003): 191-215; Carolyn Hsu, “Beyond Civil Soci-
ety: An Organizational Perspective on State-NGO Relations in the People’s Republic of 
China,” Journal of Civil Society 6, no. 3 (2010): 259-77.
13Julia Greenwood Bentley, “Survival Strategies for Civil Society Organizations in China,” 
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 6, no. 2 (February 2004).
14Association 1.  Environmental NGO, Beijing.
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state regulation to an absence of regulation.15  Contrary to the assump-
tion that the state exercises heavy control over civic activities in China, in 
some cases, it is state neglect rather than excessive control that hampers 
the operation of NGOs.  For example, an absence of adequate standards 
set by the state to guide the provision of social services has impeded non-
profit service production.16  Because it fails to inspect and punish illegal 
activities by NGOs, it is not easy to gain the public’s trust.17  Furthermore, 
as Chinese researchers have often pointed out, the Chinese state controls 
the wrong things, making it difficult to obtain legal status but easy for 
those who have this status to bend the rules and misuse their funds.18  In 
this context, Lu finds that close relations with a state agency can provide 
NGOs with more, rather than less, autonomy of operation.19
The autonomy approach tends to disregard the plurality of situations 
and activities in which NGOs are involved.  Some scholars recognize this 
plurality and find that there are actors other than the state which influence 
the work of NGOs.  Within the Chinese social space, NGOs interact not 
only with the state, but also with the media, foreign donors, and foreign 
NGOs working with similar issues.20  This study examines a variety of 
relations between advocacy NGOs and the state.  It begins with an inves-
tigation of the various roles that advocacy NGOs assume in their interac-
tions with the state.  Later, it probes into the issue of autonomy: what it 
15Association 2.  Rural development NGO, Guizhou.
16Shang Xiaoyuan, Xiaoming Wu, and Yue Wu, “Welfare Provision for Vulnerable Children,” 
China Quarterly, no. 181 (March 2005): 122-36.
17Chinese legal scholar Jin Jinping, interviewed on Decemeber 5, 2007.
18Li Yongzhong and Zhang Shouxian, “Woguo shehui zhuanxing shiqi minjian zuzhi de 
fazhan xianzhuang yu duice” (The situation and countermeasures of the development of 
popular organizations during the transformation in our country), Nanhua daxue xuebao, 
shehui kexue ban (Journal of University of South China, social science edition) (Heng-
yang) 8, no. 3 (2007): 4-6.
19Lu, Non-governmental Organizations, chap. 3.
20Cecilia Milwertz and Wang Fengxian, “The Relational and Intra-active Becoming of 
Nongovernment-initiated Organizing in the People’s Republic of China,” Gender, Tech-
nology and Development 15, no. 3 (November 2011): 457-83; Yang Guobin, “Environ-
mental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” China Quarterly, no. 181 (March 
2005): 46-66.
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means and what it does not.
The research is based on the interviews of fifty-four persons work-
ing in thirty-seven NGOs or NGO centers, about half of which have of-
ficial registration as NGOs.  Due to demanding regulations and variation 
between registration practices among local governments, not all NGOs 
in China have registered as NGOs and some are not registered at all.  In 
the interview, they were asked to introduce their campaigns.  Many of 
them provided access to their campaign materials and events, enabling 
verification of findings through participatory observation.  Thirty of the 
interviewees were women and twenty-four were men.  Due to the fact 
that many advocacy NGOs are concentrated in Beijing, this sample was 
Beijing-centered but also included fifteen NGOs from eight different 
provinces outside the capital.  All these NGOs have political or social 
aims and they engage in advocacy for these aims, although some of 
them also provide services or distribute aid.  All, including the GONGOs 
(government-organized NGOs), have independence to set their own 
goals.  Some of the GONGOs actively engage in advocacy with the gov-
ernment, albeit working with less politicized issues such as poverty and 
health.  These interviews show that the relationships between NGOs and 
the state are strategic in nature and vary considerably from one situation 
to another.
Roles Adopted to Gain Political Influence 
The mapping of the variety of the roles that NGOs adopt in their 
interactions with the state begins with the examination of the strategies 
NGOs use to influence policymaking.  Most NGOs inform the state by 
sending reports and policy recommendations to the state agencies.  Some 
use regular channels the Chinese government has established for citizen 
influence.  One NGO, for example, sends its proposals to the govern-
ment through the Bureaus for Letters and Visits (信訪局) and through the 
people’s representatives.  When asked if the NGO selectively approaches 
those people’s representatives who are known supporters of the human 
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rights agenda, the NGO said there was no need to be concerned about the 
personal preferences of the people’s representatives because these repre-
sentatives have a duty to forward the information they receive from the 
people.21  Other NGOs, however, prepare and publish policy statements 
together with people’s representatives sharing their concerns.22  The ini-
tiative to provide information does not always come from NGOs, as the 
government sometimes solicits information and technical know-how from 
NGOs or individual NGO activists.
NGOs may penetrate the state through personal networks that ex-
tend to people working within government agencies.  According to one 
NGO center, the most successful NGOs in China use contacts and net-
works typical of Chinese culture to involve government representatives 
and gain their support.23  Usually these networks are based on shared con-
cerns and visions.  For example, public schools invited a non-registered 
environmental NGO to give classes because it was cooperating with 
certain municipal education authorities that wanted to improve environ-
mental education.24  NGOs with the most efficient networks employ an in-
fluential person, such as an ex-minister or a legal expert, who is an insider 
in policy-making circles.25  Although these networks enable cooperation, 
several NGOs have distinguished this type of cooperation from institu-
tionalized channels. As long as cooperation depends on individuals within 
the government, the government agency’s commitment may lapse when 
the state employee retires or finds a new job.26
NGOs provide initiatives for the state to act upon.  They put forward 
new issues, approaches, and practices.  To galvanize the state to take ac-
tion, they attach moral incentives to their demands or threaten the state 
with unwanted consequences if the problem is left unsolved.  For ex-
21Association 3.  Human rights NGO, Beijing.
22Association 4.  Gender NGO, Beijing.
23Association 5.  NGO training center, Shanghai.
24Association 6.  Environmental NGO, Jiangsu.
25Associations 4 and 7.  Association 7.  Foreign policy GONGO, Beijing.
26Associations 1 and 4.
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ample, one NGO convinced a province that it would face a labor shortage 
unless it raised its wage levels.27
NGOs provide examples for the state to emulate.  By their concrete 
work, NGOs want to demonstrate solutions to problems for the state to 
adopt and disseminate.28  For example, one NGO established a kindergar-
ten to introduce alternative educational methods.29  Often NGOs actively 
teach the state.  They provide training for bureaucrats, policemen and 
judges, trade unionists, and journalists.30
NGOs may pressure the state through a third party.  They commonly 
make an issue public by releasing it to the media.  Some combine their 
media campaign with calls and letters to the government.  These can be 
open letters signed by NGOs and specialists or letters sent by individual 
citizens to the government.31  NGOs are responsible for creating the pub-
licity that prompts citizens to act but do not necessarily initiate the letter-
writing campaigns, as it is a long-standing practice in China for readers to 
send feedback to the government about controversial issues made public 
by the media.  To facilitate public response, one NGO even assists the 
marginalized to voice their demands by providing them with computers 
for writing petitions and explaining the justification for their demonstra-
tions to the government.32  NGOs may also pressure local governments 
through other official agencies such as higher levels of government or 
courts.33
NGOs mobilize the state.  They investigate cases of mismanagement 
or pollution and expose these cases for the state to take action.34  For ex-
ample, one NGO inspects markets and restaurants for illegal trade in wild 
27Association 8.  Labor rights NGO, Guangdong.
28Association 9.  NGO training center, Beijing.
29Association 10.  Educational NGO, Beijing.
30E.g., associations 4 and 8.
31Associations 4 and 11.  Association 11.  Environmental NGO, Beijing.
32Association 12.  Health rights NGO, Beijing.
33E.g., associations 8 and 13.  Association 13.  Environmental NGO, Yunnan.
34E.g., associations 6 and 7.
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animals and calls the police to come and punish the offenders.35  Rather 
than taking the role of independent watchdogs, NGOs engage in what 
one of them calls “advocacy in accordance with Chinese culture.”36  This 
means that NGOs inform the government about the problems they have 
identified, in the hope that the government will resolve them.   NGO activ-
ists say that they need to persuade the state to act because, by themselves, 
Chinese NGOs lack a social base that is sufficiently powerful to mobilize 
popular campaigns and because the state does not permit them to mobilize 
the people by themselves.37
When NGOs act as watchdogs, they mainly scrutinize the activities 
of social actors for the state rather than the activities of the government 
itself.  For example, they inform municipal governments about polluting 
factories,38 many of them private and even illegal.  NGOs present them-
selves as helping the government to fill in gaps in its capacity to oversee 
everything.  Indirectly, this can be a way to supervise the state, as it tar-
gets state negligence.  Although NGOs target individual projects rather 
than local governments, they sometimes succeed in causing the central 
government to intervene in irregularities resulting from collusion between 
economic interests and local governments.39  However, sometimes NGOs 
directly supervise the state activities.  Some GONGOs providing develop-
mental aid mentioned that they needed to scrutinize whether or not local 
governments had actually done their part of the project.  One openly re-
ferred to widespread corruption that compelled them to act as watchdogs 
over local governments.40
NGOs are well aware of different attitudes towards their work by 
various state agencies.  Horizontal divisions between local governments 
35Association 14.  Environmental NGO, Shanghai.
36Association 5.
37Associations 1 and 13.
38Association 6.
39Association 11.
40Associations 15 and 16.  Association 15.  Aid organization, GONGO, Beijing.  Associa-
tion 16.  Aid organization, GONGO, Beijing.
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are evident; for example, a given NGO may have a tense relationship with 
one municipal government, but still be welcomed by another municipal 
government to work within its boundaries.41  In cases of conflicting in-
terests or priorities, many NGOs seek support from government agencies 
favorable to their side.42  Vertical divisions are evident, too.  An NGO 
activist maintains that, while a desire to maximize economic profits may 
dominate at the local level, the central government wants its laws to be 
obeyed.43  Departmentalization permits NGOs to manipulate divisions 
within the state.  Playing upon these divisions can become a technique for 
gaining influence.  As one environmentalist put it, NGOs would be closed 
if they opposed the government at all administrative levels, but they can 
take advantage of inconsistencies among state agencies to criticize prob-
lems.44  Thus, NGOs commonly report local problems to higher authori-
ties and hope they will intervene.  When NGOs reveal local problems, 
some see themselves as helping the central government to monitor local 
governments.45  Other NGOs, however, complain that their political en- 
vironment is unpredictable because of the lack of consistent policies from 
one level of government to another and from one case to the next, with 
individual governmental representatives at times siding with official agen-
cies and at other times with victims.46
Other Roles
NGOs receive help and resources from local and central govern-
ments.  Many NGOs, including some well-connected unregistered NGOs, 
hold meetings in state-owned buildings or borrow equipment for their 
41Associations 9 and 17.   Association 17.  Migrant worker NGO, Beijing.
42E.g., association 18.  Labor rights NGO, Beijing.
43Association 8.
44Association 13.
45Association 19.  Environmental NGO, Beijing.
46Association 12.
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projects.47  GONGOs can utilize administrative networks for locating 
needs and for acquiring technical expertise.  One even delegates some 
project planning to governmental organs.48
Some NGOs cooperate with local governments to implement projects. 
Even those that found that it was not easy to cope with the complex mutual 
obligations involved in cooperation with the state recognized that coop- 
eration helps in cutting costs and reaching to the public.49  Many, including 
some unregistered NGOs,50 even enter the grassroots through official links. 
Many small NGOs use neighborhood committees and community centers 
to distribute information about their events.51  One GONGO even men-
tioned that a local government interested in local economic development 
had helped the GONGO to persuade local farmers to join its project.52
NGOs mimic the state.  Sometimes this is done on purpose, but often 
it occurs unintentionally because NGOs acquire their norms from the 
standard cultural repertoire.  For example, one migrant NGO organizes its 
own annual New Year’s gala.  The model for this gala is China’s official 
televised New Year’s gala.  The NGO borrows this popular form of enter-
tainment despite the propagandistic content of the official gala.  Although 
the NGO has probably borrowed this form simply because of its popular-
ity, it is aware of the opportunity that its gala offers for the dissemination 
of its values and uses the gala to showcase migrants’ talents to urbanites.53 
Another NGO launches its projects in the typical Communist Party cam-
paign style and holds hand-shaking ceremonies with local leaders.54  This 
indicates the internalization of customary Communist campaign styles, 
47E.g., association 11.
48Association 16.
49E.g., association 20.  Environmental NGO, Shanghai.
50Association 4.  See also Lu Yiyi, “Environmental Civil Society and Governance in China,” 
International Journal of Environmental Studies 64, no. 1 (February 2007): 59-69.
51Associations 20 and 21.  Association 21.  Community work NGO, Shanghai.
52Association 15.
53Association 17.
54Association 16.
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but these rituals also have strategic meaning for fundraising, media vis-
ibility, and interactions with local governments.
Some NGOs mimic the state quite consciously to borrow state au-
thority.  For example, a service-providing NGO started to hang official 
certificates and calligraphy, written by high-ranking officials, near the 
entrance of its office in order to increase its appeal to clients who cus- 
tomarily look for such symbols of state recognition as an assurance of 
quality.55  NGOs use official openings, such as commemorative days, to 
gain publicity for their issues.  In China, both the state and NGOs use 
national and international commemorative days to remind citizens of the 
importance of issues like water pollution or the plight of the disabled. 
For example, the World AIDS Day opens doors to schools for one NGO 
to give sex education dealing with homosexuality.56  NGOs use official 
slogans to appeal not only to the state, but also to the general public.  One 
adopted the slogan “harmonious society” to persuade its clients to refrain 
from behaviors that were prompting complaints from neighbors.57  An-
other referred to a government education campaign when it launched its 
own education program in primary schools.58
Many NGO activists openly advocate sociopolitical change when 
they champion public participation, community involvement, democratic 
awareness, and policy initiatives emanating from society.  Neverthe-
less, they do not take a stand against the government, but try to expand 
boundaries from within.  Hence, NGOs adapt to the government’s norms 
and use politically correct language.  To avoid using sensitive language, 
NGOs demand “adherence to laws” instead of “workers’ rights,” or “par-
ticipatory management” instead of “democracy.”59  Official vocabulary 
may also be injected into the discourse of NGOs by the people they help, 
who often like official slogans and continue to revere the central govern-
55Association 10.
56Association 22.  Gender rights NGO, Beijing.
57Association 10.
58Association 23.  Educational NGO, Hebei.
59Associations 8 and 13.
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ment even as they voice strong criticism of their immediate leaders.60
NGOs often emphasize that their aims are the same as those of the 
state—for instance, the reduction of poverty—and that they have no rea-
son or desire to come into conflict with the state.61  They see themselves 
helping the government to identify social problems or environmental mis-
conduct.62  Sometimes NGOs blur boundaries strategically to legitimize 
their work.  NGOs working with sensitive issues are often especially eager 
to find ways to hint that their activities should not be seen as oppositional. 
For example, a labor rights NGO emphasized that it only opposes govern-
ment policies rather than the government itself and that its work benefits 
China because it promotes productivity.63  One NGO described itself as 
politically neutral, but cleverly defined this to mean that it did not support 
any political party.64
Some NGOs benefit from a misconception on the part of the gov-
ernment offices that the NGOs are state units.  Sometimes NGOs use 
the status of the official agency registered as its supervisory unit.  It is 
especially common for non-registered NGOs to affiliate themselves with 
some official agency, such as a GONGO or a university department, in 
order to cope with bureaucracy and to have access to bank accounts.65 
Some NGOs introduce their issues to the policy-making process through 
their partners in state agencies.66  At other times, the blurring of identity 
is unintentional.  A student environmental organization from a provincial 
capital has cooperated successfully with a city government that originally 
received the student representatives because it had mistakenly believed 
that they were a delegation sent by the provincial government.  Now the 
student NGO and the city government conduct programs together to keep 
60Association 24.  Labor rights NGO, Guangdong.
61Association 25.  Migrant issue NGO, Beijing.
62Associations 6 and 7.
63Association 8.
64Anonymized.
65E.g. associations 4 and 26.  Association 26.  Environmental NGO, Sichuan.
66E.g., association 4.
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tourism sites clean and reduce pollution in a local industrial park.67
Some NGOs assist government or even adopt official roles.  Even 
unregistered NGOs carry out tasks that the government asks them to do.68 
One aid organization assessed that its cooperation with government is 
easy because the NGO helps local governments to do their work better.69 
The state even allocates money to NGOs for official purposes, for ex- 
ample, educating the children of revolutionary martyrs.70  Other NGOs 
have adopted work that they feel the government should do, but does 
not.71  This accords with the official discourse, often repeated by the 
NGOs themselves, that NGOs can fill gaps in state-provided services and 
deliver specific services to small groups with distinct needs.  In this way, 
they are expected to help reduce social conflicts and promote progress.72
Some NGOs that participate in international forums even speak for 
the government at such events.  They consider it their task to make in-
ternational agencies aware of conditions and needs in China.  However, 
it would be a mistake to think that these GONGOs are mouthpieces of 
the Chinese government, as the very same GONGOs have persuaded the 
Chinese government to conform to the international standards in contro-
versial developmental and health issues, such as AIDS prevention.73  One 
NGO even mentioned that the reports about the Chinese situation that 
these NGOs prepare for the international arenas could be used to super-
vise the Chinese government.74
NGOs can increase the legitimacy of the state by alleviating prob-
lems.  Due to the novelty of NGOs in China, many aid recipients tend to 
67Association 27.  Environmental student NGO, Sichuan.
68E.g., association 26.
69Association 23.
70Association 16.
71Associations 28 and 29.  Association 28.  Aid NGO, Beijing.  Association 29.  Health 
rights NGO, Beijing.
72Associations 5 and  9.
73Associations 7 and 15.
74Association 4.
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thank the government for NGO projects.75  Paradoxically, NGOs never-
theless need to convince the state of their usefulness.  Even GONGOs 
mention that they need to gain the government’s trust, because govern-
ment offices are unaccustomed to having non-state actors engage in so-
cial projects.76  To improve their position, NGOs try to prove they can 
do things that the government cannot do.77  For example, one NGO was 
initially opposed by an official agency for doing work that belongs to 
the government, but after this NGO gained recognition for its effort and 
sincerity, official opportunities started to open up.78  Even when the state 
is favorably disposed to an NGO project, it is unaccustomed to working 
with non-governmental partners.79  This can create practical problems. 
For example, one environmental project failed because the local govern-
ment assigned visiting schedules that were impractical for volunteers with 
primary commitments to their studies.80  The complex relationship that 
Chinese NGOs have with the state is exemplified by one NGO’s com-
plaint that, in China, the government unnecessarily interferes (guan), but 
does not provide positive engagement (canyu).81
In the official Chinese discourse, NGOs are understood to serve as 
“bridges” between the government and society.82  Many NGOs that rep-
resent marginal social groups do indeed perceive themselves as helping 
to link the government to its constituencies.  One NGO, for example, has 
arranged seminars where representatives of the government can meet with 
migrant workers.83  Another helps the disabled to produce media programs 
that serve both to change attitudes in society and to “link the disabled to 
75Associations 16 and 29.
76Association 15.
77E.g., association 17.
78Anonymized at the request of the association.
79Associations 19 and 20.
80Association 6.
81Association 10.
82Chen, “China’s Nongovernmental Organizations.”
83Association 17.
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the government.”84
The interviews reveal that the absence of governmental regulation 
over the associational field sometimes creates problems for NGOs.  Some 
NGOs complain that although NGO work is not illegal in China, it is not 
protected by law.  Consequently, NGOs operate in an atmosphere of un-
certainty.  Although NGOs feel they can develop as long as they do not 
break the law, oppose the government, or grow too big, they lack security 
about the permitted scope of their activities.85  Even GONGOs are not free 
of this anxiety.  Because interactions between the government and NGOs 
are not regulated by laws but develop through practice, even GONGOs do 
not know what activities are off-limits and must restrict their activities to 
what is undisputably permissible.86  However, other NGOs take advantage 
of vague regulations to expand the realm of permissible activities.  One 
labor rights NGO argued that, because it obeys laws and works for the 
poor, its activities could not be regarded as inappropriate.87
Self-censorship and boundary expansion are not the only ways 
NGOs negotiate the state controls they face.  The state seldom starts with 
repression but seeks less confrontational forms of control.  Two NGOs 
from different parts of the country recounted that the state initially ap-
proached them through a colleague or a friend who warned them not to 
continue working with a controversial case.  One dropped the case in 
question.  Although the state thus limited the NGO’s freedom to choose 
its cases, this interference did not prevent the NGO from pursuing its 
mission, since in China the problems deserving attention are many.  The 
NGO started to work on another case equally relevant to its objectives, 
this time successfully resolving the problem.  Another NGO reduced the 
state’s motivation for control by making its objectives public.  Its strategy 
was to reduce control by letting the state better understand what the NGO 
84Association 29.
85Association 1.
86Anonymized at the request of the association.
87Association 8.
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was doing and why.88  These NGOs responded to the hints the state sent 
them, but some other NGOs have continued their activities without any 
adjustment and have met with more repression by the state.
Control is not the only way the state guides associational activi-
ties.  The state may assign tasks to NGOs, with the result that NGOs may 
find themselves engaged in activities initiated not by themselves but by 
the state.  This does not necessarily mean that the NGO’s own mission 
is compromised.  For example, a city government sought technological ad-
vice from an unregistered environmental NGO for its plans to promote or-
ganic farming.  The NGO was happy to help, as it was already promoting 
green living, including eating organic food.89  Although the government 
kept the small NGO busy seeking information for the government, the 
NGO felt it was promoting its own cause.  This cooperation contributed 
to the city government’s goal of increasing farmers’ income, but it simul-
taneously served the environmental objectives of the NGO.
Roles and Distance
The preceding list of roles that NGOs play in relation to the state 
does not exhaust all possibilities.  For example, other scholars have iden-
tified evasion of state control as one NGO strategy.90  Evasion is indeed a 
common strategy for expanding social space in China,91 but interviewees 
in this study usually painted another kind of picture, in which NGOs ex-
pand their social space by informing the state.  Even many unregistered 
NGOs in China send reports and proposals to the government because the 
government loosens its vigilance and even rewards them with cooperation 
when it knows what they are doing.
88Associations 8 and 13.
89Association 26.
90E.g., Anthony J.  Spires, “Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian 
State,” American Journal of Sociology 117, no. 1 (July 2011): 1-45.
91Taru Salmenkari, “Implementing and Avoiding Control: Contemporary Art and the Chi-
nese State,” China: An International Journal 2, no. 2 (September 2004): 235-61.
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Although the list in the previous section may be incomplete, it dem-
onstrates that the various roles played by NGOs in their interactions with 
the Chinese state do not fall neatly on the continuum of distance between 
the two.  Certain roles do involve distance: penetration, cooperation, as-
sisting, adopting official tasks, and evasion.  However, NGOs adopt these 
roles regardless of their status and official registration.  Even many unreg-
istered NGOs penetrate the state and receive support from individual ad-
ministrators who share their concerns and beliefs.92  There are some other 
roles which distance might facilitate, such as supervising and pressuring 
the government.  However, in this study, the NGOs monitoring how local 
governments use resources are organizations which themselves have 
meaningful resources to distribute.  In the sample, they are all GONGOs. 
Finally, there are many roles that do not involve distance: informing, 
convincing, providing examples, mimicking, manipulating divisions, and 
increasing state legitimacy.
Investigation of the multiple roles that NGOs adopt reveals that dis-
tance to the state is not an inherent quality of an organization.  It is not 
determined by how an NGO is founded, registered, or funded.  A single 
NGO can play roles which bring it close to the government and roles 
which create distance.  Since independent NGOs are working in the same 
state-centered reality as GONGOs, they can choose to penetrate the state 
or mimic the state in the same way that registered NGOs do.  If there is a 
difference, it is in the degree of state support, as not all the contacts and 
resources available to GONGOs are accessible to all NGOs.  However, 
one needs to be careful with generalizations since some unregistered 
NGOs are extremely well-connected and since the registered status obvi-
ously is not very important for the state.  When the state seeks expertise, 
it readily approaches even unregistered NGOs.
An NGO’s disposition toward the state is not a fixed organizational 
quality; rather, it is situational and contextualized.  The same organization 
chooses to play various roles depending on its activities and aims.  The 
92E.g., Associations 1 and 4.
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degree of autonomy it seeks depends on what it is doing.  In a way, this 
choice of the roles and the degree of autonomy is strategic, although one 
should not underestimate the degree to which some of these choices are 
natural and unreflected for people who are acculturated to the Chinese po-
litical system.  In addition, factors beyond the control of the NGOs them-
selves play a part in these choices.  What an NGO can expect from the 
state and from a particular state agency is not irrelevant in these choices.
Moreover, distance does not seem to correlate with associational 
autonomy if autonomy is defined as the ability to fulfill the aims the NGO 
has set for itself.  Cooperation with the government, at times to the degree 
that some tasks of the NGO and the government overlap, can be a way to 
have these aims implemented in a much more efficient way than would be 
possible for the NGO alone.  NGOs work for policy change because they 
are well aware of the government’s capacity to implement laws and poli-
cies nationally, something NGOs themselves cannot do.
The equating of autonomy and distance has obscured the fact that 
analytically autonomy in associational activities can mean more than one 
thing.  Apart from meaning out of the reach of the state, autonomy can refer 
to the self-determination of activities or self-management of programs with- 
out assistance from the state.  Chinese NGOs are generally able to decide 
their goals and, as the preceding examples demonstrate, even repression 
often does not compromise their overall mission, although it may com-
promise self-management in individual cases.  In Chinese NGOs, a do-
it-yourself attitude is quite common.  Some of the NGOs interviewed for 
this study have opened spaces for migrant workers to gather or collected 
books for school children in impoverished areas without government as-
sistance.  In China, NGOs actively look for social solutions, but are ready 
to turn to the state when they want political solutions.  The readiness to 
seek social solutions may derive from the Chinese tradition of communal 
management of local affairs and the values of communist voluntarism,93 
93Interviews with Chinese civil society scholars Yang Tuan, Fan Lizhu and Yuan Ruijun, on 
November 13, December 21, 2007 and December 28, 2007, respectively.
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but simultaneously the prevalence of social solutions is due to the weak-
ness of the state as a welfare provider.  Until very recently, the Chinese 
state simply did not provide the kind of programs which have led many 
Japanese advocacy NGOs to channel state welfare distributions to solve 
social problems.94
Chinese NGOs are generally aware that the state restricts their ac-
tivities and often mention that they might do things differently if it were 
possible.  However, when they referred to what could be understood as 
the autonomy agenda in the interviews, they usually did not speak about 
organizational autonomy, but about capacitating ordinary people in com-
munities or in marginalized groups to act on their own.  Sometimes this 
meant acting without state assistance, but other times it meant commu-
nicating their needs to the government.  Thus, the relevant autonomy 
conception is not anti-state, but self-determination and ability to do it 
yourself.  Moreover, the centrality of autonomy in the work of NGOs is a 
controversial issue.  Even within a single NGO, there are different views 
about the right balance between the search for independent activity in so-
ciety and the NGOs’ primary goals.  Some prioritize the issue their NGO 
is working for and criticize others for focusing on movement building at 
the cost of practical work.95
Autonomous, Popular, and Democratic?
Scholars tie autonomy to a bundle of other issues which, as will 
be shown, are independent of autonomy.  Among the characteristics that 
are expected to accompany autonomy are a bottom-up working style, a 
grassroots approach, attention to popular voice, and democracy.  Thus, 
94Karen Nakamura, “Resistance and Co-optation: The Japanese Federation of the Deaf and 
Its Relations with State Power,” Social Science Japan Journal 5, no. 1 (April 2002): 17-
35.
95Anonymized.
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more autonomous NGOs are often referred to as “grassroots”96 NGOs, 
“popular”97 NGOs, “people’s”98 NGOs, or even as “unofficial, ‘bottom-up’ 
grassroots NGOs” (草根組織).99  These appellations are intended to con-
trast with “top-down,” “centralized,” “governmental,” and even “undemo-
cratic.”  This terminology implies that NGOs having closer links to the 
government belong at the less democratic end of the continuum, or even 
dichotomy.  This is by no means self-evident.  “Non-state” is a different 
category than “close to people” or “democratically run.”
In fact, independence does not automatically bring with it increased 
citizen participation.100  Some unregistered NGOs are very good at in-
volving the marginalized in their activities and even help them speak 
for themselves in public or state arenas.101  Others succeed in organizing 
non-members, such as students and journalists, to join their activities. 
One NGO had its own man in a poor rural area to assess needs through 
personal information-gathering and networking, thus reaching the needy 
left outside of state welfare distributions.102  However, some GONGOs 
likewise engage in dialogue with the local people, although the dialogues 
mentioned by interviewees were more about the implementation of de-
velopmental projects decided elsewhere and even involved an effort to 
persuade farmers to invest now in new technologies which in the long run 
will bring them profit.103  Although this dialogue addressed farmer’s con-
cerns, there was an evident top-down element in the process.  However, 
  96Bao Maohong, “Environmental NGOs in Transforming China,” Nature and Culture 4, no. 
1 (Spring 2009): 1-16; Shawn Shieh and Guosheng Deng, “An Emerging Civil Society: 
The Impact of the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake on Grass-Roots Associations in China,” 
China Journal, no. 65 (January 2011): 181-94.
  97Sharon Liang, “Walking the Tightrope: Civil Society Organizations in China,” China 
Rights Forum, no. 3 (2003): 11-15.
  98Zhang and Baum, “Anatomy of a Rural NGO,” 99.
  99Spires, “Contingent Symbiosis,” 10.
100Ma Qiusha, “Defining Chinese Nongovernmental Organizations,” Voluntas: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 13, no. 2 (June 2002): 113-30.
101E.g., associations 17 and 29.
102Association 30.  Aid NGO, Beijing.
103Association 15.
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many other GONGOs efficiently encourage civic participation and com-
munity action.104
One should be careful not to assume, as some have, that “NGOs are 
a vehicle for democratization in China by virtue of the fact that they are 
closely connected to the grassroots.”105  Research literature from many de-
veloping countries shows that often NGOs passing the criteria for auton-
omy set by Western researchers and donors are poorly integrated with so-
ciety.106  They focus on issues that interest the urban, educated elites who 
run these NGOs rather than on local needs.107  As many NGOs are more 
accountable to international donors than to the local populace,108 they can 
become tools to advance unpopular policies.109  Sometimes NGOs are 
even inimical to grassroots organizing.110  According to Chatterjee, where 
civil society organizations are exclusive domains of an imported elite cul-
ture, they end up providing pedagogy rather than increasing opportunities 
for free association among ordinary citizens.111
104Catherine Goetze, “Whose Civil Society Is It Anyway?” in China’s Opening Society: The 
Non-state Sector and Governance, ed. Zheng Yongnian and Joseph Fewsmith (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 36-53.
105Katherine Morton, “The Emergence of NGOs in China and Their Transnational Link-
ages,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 4 (December 2005): 526.
106David Abramson, “A Critical Look at NGOs and Civil Society as Means to an End in 
Uzbekistan,” Human Organization 58, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 240-50; Steven Sampson, “The 
Social Life of Projects,” in Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, ed. Chris Hann 
and Elizabeth Dunn (London: Routledge, 1996), 121-42.
107Ebenezer Obadare, “Civil Society in West Africa: Between Discourse and Reality,” in 
Exploring Civil Society: Political and Cultural Context, ed. Marlies Glasius, David 
Lewis, and Hakan Seckinelgin (London: Routledge, 2004): 136-43.
108Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, “Rethinking Civil Society,” Democratization 10, no. 3 
(Autumn 2003): 1-14; Claire Mercer, “NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A 
Critical Review of the Literature,” Progress in Development Studies 2, no. 1 (January 
2002): 5-22.
109Julie Hearn, “The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in Africa,” Review of African Po-
litical Economy 28, no. 87 (March 2001): 43-53.
110Dip Kapoor, “NGO Partnerships and the Taming of the Grassroots in Rural India,” De-
velopment in Practice 15, no. 2 (April 2005): 210-15.
111Partha Chatterjee, “On Civil and Political Society in Postcolonial Democracies,” in Civil 
Society, ed. Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 165-78.
Encounters between Chinese NGOs and the State
June 2014 165 
As many Chinese NGOs are run by urban intellectuals and funded by 
foreign donors, China is not devoid of similar examples.  In an interview, 
Professor Kang Xiaoguang112 mentioned an international project which 
allocated funds to an urban Chinese NGO.  Unaccustomed to modest 
living in poor villages, this NGO spent most of the funding on transporta-
tion and hotel rooms.  Consequently, the time it spent in the villages was 
too short to gain an understanding of the local situation, a problem that 
was further exacerbated by the fact that villagers used a dialect unfamiliar 
to the NGO personnel.  The project eventually failed.  This example 
shows that NGOs are not automatically more attuned to social needs than 
the state is.  Some unregistered NGOs have a desire to integrate into the 
rural communities they help but, because their members are employed in 
urban areas, they can visit these communities only a few days a year.113 
By contrast, some staff members of GONGOs have years of experience in 
volunteering in remote rural areas,114 although others, accustomed to 
urban lifestyles, are appalled with living conditions among the aid re-
cipients in the rural periphery.115
Many Chinese NGOs involve themselves in official community-
building programs or public school curricula to reach people at the grass-
roots.116  Some NGOs maintain their relations with the needy at the grass-
roots level through the extensive networks of official mass organizations, 
such as the Youth League or the Women’s Federation.117  One GONGO 
uses the government to locate the needy areas.118  The state, which col-
lects systematic information from the whole population and from all 
areas of the country, naturally has more extensive knowledge of the over-
112Interviewed on December 14, 2007.
113Association 11.
114Association 15.
115Association 16.
116E.g. associations 6 and 31.  Association 31.  Environmental NGO, Shanghai.
117Association 4.  Also see Carolyn Hsu, “‘Rehabilitating Charity’ in China,” Journal of 
Civil Society 4, no. 2 (September 2008): 81-96.
118Association 16.
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all situation than any NGO could have.
Independence from the state can be an obstacle to strengthening ties 
to the populace.  Chinese NGO scholar Jin Jinping119 believes that ordi-
nary Chinese citizens lack trust in NGOs because the state does little to 
control mismanagement of funds by NGOs.  This mistrust makes it dif-
ficult to fundraise from society.120  Here, independence from state control 
may conflict with financial independence and social support, although 
a closer relationship with the state has not solved similar irregularities 
within GONGOs.  The Chinese, who mistrust NGOs in general,121 do not 
differentiate them according to their distance from the state.  A gender 
rights activist122 argues that the main victims of the scandal that hit the 
Red Cross Society in 2011 were not GONGOs but numerous small orga-
nizations which had to close after their funding dried up.  There is little 
that many advocacy NGOs can do to convince the public.  Some openly 
admit that they are not known to the public.123
Another issue that is distinct from autonomy is democratic manage-
ment of the NGO.  Many Chinese NGOs have strong leaders.  NGOs 
are highly dependent on the charisma, skills, and social contacts of their 
leaders.124  Some have non-democratic, non-transparent leadership styles 
that alienate the staff.125  Among the NGOs interviewed, the least leader-
centered organizations were GONGOs, which have resources that allow 
119Interviewed on December 5, 2007.
120Jessica C. Teets, “Post-Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction Efforts: The Emergence of 
Civil Society in China?” China Quarterly, no. 198 (June 2009): 330-47.
121Christopher Heurlin, “(Dis)Trusting NGOs in China” (paper presented at the Forum on 
NGO Governance and Management in China Program, University of Alberta, August 16, 
2013); Benjamin Tipton, “Follow the Money: Philanthropy in China” (master’s thesis, 
University of British Columbia, 2012).
122No organizational affiliation.
123Associations 1 and 32.  Association 32.  Health rights NGO, Beijing.
124Associations 33 and 34.  Association 33.  Gender rights NGO, registered, Guangdong. 
Association 34.  Health rights NGO, registered, Beijing.  See also Xie Lei and Arthur 
Mol, “The Role of Guanxi in the Emerging Environmental Movement in China,” in 
Community and Ecology: Dynamics of Place, Sustainability and Politics, ed. Aaron M. 
McCright and Terry Nichols Clark (Amsterdam: Emerald, 2006), 269-92.
125Lu, Non-governmental organizations.
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them to hire capable personnel, and their large size causes them to rely 
more on organizational routinization than on personal commands.  This 
does not mean that GONGOs never have charismatic leaders; some do.  It 
does suggest, however, that it may be difficult for unregistered organiza-
tions to escape dependency on individual leaders as many have to rely on 
voluntarism to run the organization.  Voluntarism does not prevent demo-
cratic decision-making but, to make people devote their free time without 
pay, voluntarism rewards people by making them feel they are doing 
things that are meaningful to them.  Not only does this limit the number 
of people ready to take responsibility for routine operations, but it also 
means that leaders want to feel the organization serves their aims.  There-
fore, if unregistered NGOs grow beyond a few relatively equal friends, 
they may be committed to a democratic process but may still, to the 
dismay of members, centralize power in the leaders, on whose networks 
they rely for their resources.126  Most unregistered NGOs have few oppor-
tunities to build an impersonal organization as they cannot open bank ac-
counts.  Although many have other means to receive money from foreign 
donors, donors usually do not fund an organization’s operational costs as 
such.
Finally, one must critically analyze the relationship, often assumed 
to be mutually supportive, between democracy and social space.127  Al-
though generally speaking this may be true, democratization probably 
would not keep the Chinese state from interfering in society.  Blurred 
state-society boundaries and strong states are typical of democratic East 
Asian countries as well.128  It would be unrealistic to expect that the prob-
lems Chinese NGOs meet with the registration system would simply go 
126Association 1.
127Larry Jay Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 
3 (July 1994): 4-17; Chen Jie, “The NGO Community in China: Expanding Linkages 
with Transnational Civil Society and Their Democratic Implications,” China Perspec-
tives, no. 68 (November-December 2006): 29-40.
128Mary Alice Haddad, “A State-in-Society Approach to the Nonprofit Sector,” Voluntas 
22, no. 1 (March 2011): 26-47; Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr, The State of Civil 
Society in Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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away with democratization.129  After all, Japanese NGOs have had similar 
difficulties with the registration system,130 and even after democratization, 
some Taiwanese NGOs still find that the registration system is obstruct-
ing the expansion of their social reach.131  Obviously, something regional, 
either a culturally acquired or a mutually learned approach to legislation, 
explains these difficulties, quite apart from democracy.
Although democracy usually opens more social space for NGOs, it 
does not necessarily facilitate NGOs’ efforts to reach their political aims. 
An international NGO introducing its campaign, already successful in 
China, to Taiwan, remarked that China is a good environment for NGO 
campaigns because, when the authoritarian Chinese state becomes aware 
of a problem, it takes effective action.132  It thus anticipated that cam-
paigning would be more challenging in Taiwan.  In this context, Chinese 
NGOs’ contribution to expanding social space is evident, but we may ask, 
now that some NGOs have established fruitful cooperation with the pres-
ent regime, where would those NGOs stand in a democratization process 
leading to political pluralism?  In the past, business associations have 
sided with the state against the democracy movement.133
Big Society, but Small State?
Although NGOs participating in this study often criticized the Chi-
nese state for regulating the wrong things and making their work difficult, 
129About the registration system, see Saich, “Negotiating the State,” 126-33; Yang Zhengxi 
and Tang Ming, “Lun woguo NGO (feizhengfu zuzhi) fazhan mianlin de falü zhang’ai 
ji jiejue tujing” (Analysis on the legal barriers the development of NGOs faces in China 
and the ways to solve them), Beijing jiaotong daxue xuebao, shehui kexue ban (Journal 
of Beijing Jiaotong University, social sciences edition), no. 3 (2007): 88-92.  The new 
registration law adopted in 2013 is likely to make registration easier for professional as-
sociations and associations providing social services, but not for advocacy NGOs.
130Robert Pekkanen, “Japan’s New Politics: The Case of the NPO Law,” Journal of Japanese 
Studies 26, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 111-48.
131Interview with a Taiwanese environmental NGO.
132Association 35.  Environmental NGO, Beijing.
133David Wank, “Private Business, Bureaucracy, and Political Alliance in a Chinese City,” 
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 33 (January 1995): 55-71.
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many of them also hold that the state should regulate more things than 
it currently does.  They want the state to intervene in domestic violence, 
illegal logging, and many other social and environmental problems much 
more actively than it does now.  Thus, NGOs with political goals are 
more, rather than less, likely to work with the government.
The interviews implicitly reveal that NGOs turn to the government 
because they take it as a legitimate actor in many fields.  NGOs recognize 
that the state has the monopoly of legislation and policy implementation. 
None of the NGOs interviewed for this study questioned that there should 
be public schools or government programs for social and economic de- 
velopment.  They do not hold anti-state disposition, but distinguish be-
tween what the state does and what society should do.  Moreover, the 
NGOs interviewed for this study have internalized the idea of a strong 
developmental state actively engaging in society and people’s lives.  Most 
NGOs even approved state assistance for associational development and 
activities, sometimes hoping for more assistance than is currently avail-
able.  Others wanted to be involved in shaping the policy agenda, rather 
than reducing the scope of state activity.
The legitimacy and centrality of the state becomes evident, for ex-
ample, in one NGO’s definition of two commonly used terms for civil 
society in the Chinese language.  According to the NGO, gongmin shehui 
(citizen society) refers to social activity which reveals problems in so-
ciety for the government in order to make it solve the problems, while 
shimin shehui (city people’s society) refers to service recipients’ activities 
to improve social services.134  The state is central in both areas, either as 
the policy implementer or as a service provider.  Simultaneously, civil 
society should have an active role.  In this picture, civil society generates 
bottom-up demands reflecting social realities and needs.  Nevertheless, 
NGOs recognize top-down processes as necessary.  For example, after 
the Ya’an earthquake, NGOs saw themselves as superior in providing ac-
curate information about the grassroots needs, but acknowledged the need 
134Association 14.
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for the coordination of aid activities by the state.135  In contrast to the idea 
of small government and big society, 136 common in Chinese academic 
discussions, Chinese civil society practitioners interviewed for this study 
rather seemed to desire a strong state and strong society.  In this ideal, 
civil society is freer to make its own choices and to mobilize society to 
make demands towards the government, but simultaneously the state 
provides welfare more comprehensively and implements laws more effi-
ciently.  Even an NGO having the reduction of taxes on its agenda simul- 
taneously demands better welfare services.  It aims for a transparent tax 
system using collected taxes for the benefit of the people, rather than a 
small government.137  NGOs do not want to reduce the scope of the state, 
but many of them insist that the state should change its top-down decision- 
making style and adopt more bottom-up initiatives from civil society.
Conclusions
This study has shown that organizational charts and registered sta-
tuses tell little about the distance Chinese advocacy NGOs maintain with 
the state or about their reach to society.  As this article shows, the pre-
sumed advantages of being autonomous are not automatically there and, 
therefore, it should not presumed that more independent NGOs differ from 
GONGOs in some predictable ways.  Individual organizations in both cat-
egories can succeed or fail in promoting popular participation and demo-
cratic values, depending on their own values and capacities rather than on 
their distance from the government.  Moreover, this distance is a dynamic, 
not a fixed, factor.  For Chinese advocacy NGOs, autonomy from the state 
is situational and partly strategic.  However, the closeness to the govern-
135Association 36.  NGO center, Zhejiang.
136Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “State and Society in Hainan: Liao Xun’s Ideas on ‘Small Gov-
ernment, Big Society’,” in Reconstructing Twentieth-century China, ed. Kjeld Erik 
Brødsgaard and David Strand (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 189-215.
137Association 37.  Think tank, Beijing.
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ment is not explained only by the NGOs’ pursuit of influence and state-
distributed resources, nor is it dependent on opportunities, such as allies 
in government agencies sharing the NGO’s priorities.  Political culture 
and social expectations also explain why NGOs adopt certain strategies, 
practices, and vocabularies.  Both civil society practitioners’ and the 
public’s expectations have been shaped by the decades of Communist 
Party rule propagating certain norms and practices.  Finally, personal 
traits are not irrelevant in explaining the pursuit of autonomy.  For exam-
ple, one leader attributed the readiness of his NGO to adopt controversial 
issues and tactics to the fact that he personally “likes challenges.”138  By 
contrast, many other interviewees emphasized their willingness to work 
with others, including the government.
The closeness to the state is partly attributable to the comparative 
advantages that states, in China and other countries, have when it comes 
to scale, opportunities, resources, and norms.  This imbalance means that 
often advocacy NGOs need to work not only with the state, but through 
the state, especially if they want to ensure a national impact through laws 
and policies.  In China these comparative advantages are a reality even in 
the fields which are often thought to be the strengths of NGOs, such as 
the division of power within an organization and the reach to the grass-
roots.  The Chinese state manipulates its comparative advantages vis-à-vis 
NGOs to slant the situation even further in its favor.  More than repres-
sive techniques, NGOs interviewed for this study worry that, in order to 
be permitted to operate, there is a limit to their social reach, funding, and 
activities.  All of these limitations keep advocacy NGOs small and restrict 
their social reach, but seldom limit their autonomy to choose issues that 
are meaningful to them.
138Association 12.
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Appendix: Interviewees
Association 1. Environmental NGO, unregistered, Beijing, three interviewees.
Association 2. Rural development NGO, registered, Guizhou.
Association 3. Human rights NGO, registered, Beijing.
Association 4. Gender NGO, unregistered, Beijing, two interviewees.
Association 5. NGO training center, registered, Shanghai, two interviewees.
Association 6. Environmental NGO, unregistered, Jiangsu, three interviewees.
Association 7. Foreign policy NGO, GONGO, Beijing.
Association 8. Labor rights NGO, registered but not as an NGO, Guangdong.
Association 9. NGO training center, registered, Beijing.
Association 10. Educational NGO, registered as a school, Beijing.
Association 11. Environmental NGO, unregistered, Beijing, two interviewees.
Association 12. Health rights NGO, registered but not as an NGO, Beijing.
Association 13. Environmental NGO, registered, Yunnan.
Association 14. Environmental NGO, unregistered, Shanghai.
Association 15. Aid organization, GONGO, Beijing.
Association 16. Aid organization, GONGO, Beijing.
Association 17. Migrant worker NGO, unregistered, Beijing.
Association 18. Labor rights NGO, registered but not as NGO, Beijing.
Association 19. Environmental NGO, registered, Beijing.
Association 20. Environmental NGO, registered, Shanghai, two interviewees.
Association 21. Community work NGO, registered, Shanghai, two interviewees.
Association 22. Gender rights NGO, unregistered, Beijing.
Association 23. Educational NGO, registered, Hebei.
Association 24. Labor rights NGO, registration in Hong Kong, working in Guang- 
dong.
Association 25. Migrant issue NGO, registered, Beijing.
Association 26. Environmental NGO, unregistered, Sichuan, two interviewees.
Association 27. Environmental student NGO, registered, Sichuan, two inter- 
viewees.
Association 28. Aid NGO, registered, Beijing. 
Association 29. Health rights NGO, registered but not as an NGO, Beijing, two 
interviewees.
Association 30. Aid NGO, registered, Beijing, two interviewees.
Association 31. Environmental NGO, registered, Shanghai, two interviewees.
Association 32. Health rights NGO, registered but not as NGO, Beijing.
Association 33. Gender rights NGO, registered, Guangdong. 
Association 34. Health rights NGO, registered, Beijing, three interviewees.
Association 35. Environmental NGO, unregistered in China, Beijing, two inter- 
viewees.
Association 36. NGO center, registered, Zhejiang.
Association 37. Think tank, registered but not as NGO, Beijing.
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